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I am going to present some findings from the Detroit Arab American Study.  This is the 
most comprehensive, in depth public opinion type study ever done of Arab Americans.   
We interviewed 1016 persons from the three-county Detroit area.  We also did a 
companion study of 508 people from the general population, asking most of the same 
questions.  Respondents  were chosen by scientific sampling techniques. The interviews 
averaged 80 minutes and were done by  trained bilingual interviewers.  Many of the 
questions were drawn from the classics of social research, but others were created to tap 
unique issues relevant to the community.  The Russell Sage Foundation funded the 
project and the Andrew W. Mellon  Foundation provided supplementary support.  There 
are seven researchers on the team, myself being one.  The DAAS is now in the public 
domain and is available through the Institute of Social Research.  I invite anyone to use it.  
 There are certain things that a survey can do and certain things it cannot do. It has 
two particular advantages.  First, it has the advantage of breadth.  It covers the whole 
community, not just that part  the researcher knows best.  Second, it  can free us from our 
preconceptions.  When I was a struggling graduate student and having a difficult time 
with a paper, my professor gave me wise advice:  “Let the data speak to you.”  Numbers 
do not tell everything, but they tell us something that we cannot learn otherwise.  And 
sometimes they  get us away from something we know to be true but are not quite sure 
why we know it except that everybody says it is true.  
 Let me start by asking you to think about the anticipated participation patterns in 
two very different Arab American communities.   The first is primarily an immigrant 
community with 78% of its adults born overseas.  86% do not speak English in the home 
and 63% get their news from overseas via satellite dishes. A full half think an Arab or 
Muslim accused of terrorism could not receive a fair trial in the U.S.  Would such a 
community even participate in American politics?   
 Now consider a second community.  78% are citizens,  86% say they feel at home 
in America,  91% say they are proud to be America, and 86% say they have confidence in 
the local police.  Will they not be at the front of very parade?  
 Of course, the question is a trick.  These are not two communities at all but one, 
reflecting data from the study.  If the responses to these questions seem to defy simple 
answers, then indeed, they defy simple answers.   
I have been asked to focus my talk upon gender differences.  The approach in my 
written paper is much broader than gender, focusing upon participation patterns in their 
various dimensions.  Anyone who wants the full paper can contact me via email.  
 The way political scientists  analyze public opinion data is to begin with what we 
know about those people not in the study.  In other words, what is the national pattern 
and especially what is the theory behind what we have found in the past and expect to 
find  in this case? 
 What we know about participation in general is that certain types of participation, 
such as voting, are linked to position in society. Those who are educated, wealthy, or 
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own property are more likely to vote.  Level of information is also a major factor, and 
being a male seems to play a role.  Other types of participation, such as involvement in 
community groups, are not nearly so dependent upon those factors.  To an extent, these 
two types of participation operate independently.  Writing to your representative and 
getting involved in the PTA require very different skills and very different orientations to 
the political system.   Here is the research question:  What is the pattern of participation 
in the Arab American community, what drives participation,  and do different patterns of  
participation overlap or  operate separately?    
 A second thing we know is that in an immigrant community the congregation 
plays a key role.  Churches and mosques are really religio-ethnic groups, typically 
drawing from sub-elements of the community.  As such they help people engage 
American society but also empower them to resist those elements of society that treat 
them unfairly.  Research in the Black community is particularly helpful in this regard.  
The Black community is similar to Arab Americans in that both are somewhat 
marginalized and both share a strong sense of group identity.  The Black churches have 
traditionally done two things for their members.  First, they encouraged positive 
engagement with society, telling people to vote and organize and participate.  Second, 
they created an “oppositional consciousness,”  telling people that their community is 
treated unfairly and they should try to change that situation.  The research question: does 
this  same pattern prevail in the Arab American community?  
 The third thing we know is that participation patterns by gender have their own 
dynamic.  Burns et al did the definitive study of this and I have followed their key bit of 
advice.  They said we should not think of men and women as categories  but should 
reconceptualize the question.  Male and female participation patterns are not 
homogeneous but  represent  two bell shaped curves whose means do not overlap.  In 
other words, there are a range of male participation patterns and a range of female 
participation patterns, with men generally more involved than women, but with both 
exhibiting high and low patterns.  We have been told that Arabs have a patriarchal society 
in which women are inhibited in their pursuit of the public arena.  Our president has told 
us that the American armies in Iraq and Afghanistan are acting partially to promote 
women’s rights. Here is the research question: Do Arab American gender patterns follow 
the national pattern or is there a distinct “Arab” pattern?  
 What did I find?  There are four major findings.   
 First,  Arab Americans have a definite participation deficit compared with the 
general population.  The first two columns of Table 1 show this.  Whether it is voting, 
following the news, having a party preference,  or being involved in the PTA, Arabs are 
less engaged than the general public.  
Second, when we look at how different types of participation are related, we see 
confirmation of the national pattern of a disconnect.  In Table 2, voting is highly 
correlated with signing a petition, sending money to a political cause, or writing to an 
official.  There is also a class interest pattern. We asked whether respondents were 
involved in any ‘business or professional group.”  That could involve everything from 
shopkeepers to attorneys to import-export firms.  Whatever it means, it empowers and 
charges other relationships.  Those active in such associations are active at high levels in 
almost every other area.   
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 Look now at Table 3, looking at the political act of voting and the locally-oriented 
act of being involved in the PTA.  Here the expected  pattern appears very clearly.  
Income, education and business ownership correlate highly with whether one voted, but 
much less with PTA involvement.   In three areas (information, own a business, trust 
people) the pattern runs in the same direction for both men and women.  But these traits 
are much stronger in pushing voting than in pushing PTA involvement.  Being married, 
living in the Dearborn “enclave” (where 2/3 of all Muslims live, and few Christians),   
and being female sustain PTA activities. Clearly these two types of activities call upon 
different resources and different types of people.  
 Third,  what role does religious activity play in political involvement? There is a 
term that academics use called social capital.  It involves those things that make us 
stronger citizens.  It involves self-confidence, trust in society,  commitment, engagement.  
It has two dimensions, which Putnam calls bonding and bridging.  Bonding  pulls 
together homogeneous populations around their shared identity.  Bridging pulls together 
diverse populations in common purposes. If bonding leads to bridging, then society 
benefits.  But what Putnam calls “the dark side of social capital” occurs when bonding 
becomes less integrative than separatist.  Here is the research question: does religious 
involvement lead to wider social engagement or to separatism?   
 Table 4 offers some answers, with comparison to the general population.  Clearly,  
religious institutions push individuals into the political and public arena. Religiously 
active individuals are more involved overall and more likely to be participants in the 
political arena.  They are more likely to feel a part of the country and to affirm what is 
often called the “civic religion,” the belief that this is a land that should generate  pride. 
They are also more likely to have doubts about the fairness of the legal system, to resist 
any restrictions on civil liberties, and to feel that there is a hostile environment in which 
Arab Americans are not fully respected.  These numbers show in combination that Arab 
religious organizations tend to generate social capital that involves both bonding and 
bridging.  To a lesser extent they promote both an oppositional consciousness and support 
for the civil religion. In other words, Arabs fit the pattern very nicely.  
 Finally, what do we find about gender?  Table 1, columns 4 and 5, shows that 
men and women are remarkably similar in many ways.  I call this A Pattern of Minimal 
Differences.  They are similar in whether they are citizens, are fluent in English,  watch 
television news, read an Arabic newspaper,  perceive that the media is unfriendly, and 
follow the war on terror.  They are equally likely to feel at home in America, to identify 
with the country, and to feel this is a land of equal  opportunity.  They have similar 
partisan identifications and similar ideological orientations.  In an unpublished analysis of 
gender experiences and perspective in the aftermath of September 11, I found a 
remarkable absence of differences in this significant area.  Men and women were within a 
few percentage points of each other in terms of whether they had a bad experience after 
September 11 (15%) or whether they had a supportive experience (34%).  Regarding the 
“security mom” hypothesis, that women were more worried about safety  than men, there 
is  some support, but mixed.  Women were  7% more likely to say September 11 had 
shaken their sense of security and 11% more likely to say the Iraq War had shaken their 
sense of security.  Still, men and women were nearly identical in their willingness to 
compromise on civil liberties to enhance security. Women and men both have high levels 
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of confidence in local institutions such as the police, the schools and the legal system, 
and were equally trusting of people in general.  
 Just for your interest,  on cultural issues, women and men were again very similar. 
Women were 19% more likely to say that premarital sex was never justified (59% to 
78%) and slightly more likely to say that women should dress modestly, but were 
otherwise similar to men on topics including gambling, abortion and alcohol use.  
 The big gender divergence, and it is big, involves those resources that drive 
participation.  Women are 30% less likely to work outside of the home, and  9% less 
likely to have a college degree. They are in serious deficit in media consumption.  They 
are significantly less likely to read a daily newspaper or get news from the internet.  They 
were 27% less likely to know the name of  Attorney General Ashcroft and 16% less 
likely to know  the majority party. To be honest, these findings are not surprising.  Burns 
et al found that men were 14% more likely to know the name of their Senator than 
women. While we should not over generalize, the expectation that men are more likely 
than women to have a public life appears to have support in this data.  
 But the question remains: What drives participation by gender?  Table 5 shows 
what drives men and women into the voting booth.  Let me give you some missing 
numbers to write onto that table.   
 
  M   F  
 Education  .318 .324 
 Income  .410 .259 
 Read newspapers .331 .329 
 Identify major party .222 .240 
 Working  .082 .064 
 English fluency .264 .362 
 
The patterns are remarkably similar and track national trends.  Being possessed of 
critical political resources--education, income, information—pushes  involvement.  All 
patterns are highly significant at the .000 level except work outside the home, which is 
not significant for either gender. Male voting appears to be  more influenced by income 
level, female voting  more by English fluency, but otherwise these are similar stories.  
Anyone looking for an “Arab effect” in this data will have to look long and hard to  find 
it.  Arab Americans are different from the general population in their statistical means, 
just as men are different from women in their statistical means.  But by and large, what 
drives anyone away from those means, into higher participation rates or into lower 
participation rates, is very similar for all population groups analyzed in this paper.  
If you are looking for a headline to summarize these finding, I suggest the 
following: Arab-Americans:  History different, situation different,  participation patterns 
boringly normal.  
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